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Whitaker the court did not have complete information on the effect of
such a determination, and it was probably correct in refusing to reach
the substantive issues without that information. Particularly, the testi-
mony in the trial court had not developed fully the complex set of hydro-
logical facts involved. Since the case is one of first impression, the ultimate
decision probably will rest largely on policy grounds, and a full under-
standing of whose water is involved and how much will be used is essential
to a wise decision.
Since the case must now go back to the district court for a full trial,
one can only speculate on the ultimate outcome. The fact that the dispute
arose in the first place, however, suggests some needed changes in oil and
gas lease forms. From the standpoint of the oil companies the case sug-
gests that leases should provide for use of techniques unknown when the
lease is executed. ' In addition, a decision for Whitaker would indicate that
the lessee's rights in the surface are not so broad as past cases suggest, and
all oil companies, not just those seeking to use fresh water for waterflood-
ing, should re-examine their attitudes toward surface uses. In particular,
these rights should be considered from the standpoint of how much of the
surface estate will be needed by the lessee for his operations.
The same consideration is applicable to the lessor. From his standpoint
the case indicates what should already be clear: an oil company lease form
should not be signed without giving some thought to the surface rights
being surrendered. Though most forms are not too one-sided in their terms,
the oil companies are concerned with insuring that they have all surface
rights they will need, not with protecting the lessor against damage to his
retained estate. The mere fact that a form contains some restrictions on
the lessee's surface rights should not delude the lessor into thinking that
those restrictions necessarily encompass all situations in which his enjoy-
ment of the surface will conflict with the lessee's operations. In water
rights provisions especially, the lessor should consider his own needs for
water and should insist that the lease restrictions control the quantity of
water to be removed as well as the location from which the lessee may
remove it.
Rufus S. Scott
Refusal To Settle Claim Below Policy Limits - Insurer's
Excess Liability - Damages for Mental Suffering
An elderly widow owned an apartment building with general liability
insurance coverage of $10,000. One of her tenants suffered physical in-
juries and developed a severe psychosis after a stairway tread gave way
causing the tenant to fall through the opening up to her waist. A suit for
" There is a possibility that this need may be even more acute on leases being executed today
than it was on older ones. Modern lease forms attempt to make express provision for all surface
uses which the lessee knows about. If a case like Whitaker should arise in connection with some
use not expressly permitted in one of these more modern forms, the court might fall back on the
concept of expressio unis est exclusio alterius: that all surface uses not expressly granted are ex-
cluded by implication.
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negligence was brought against the widow. Pursuant to its contractual
duty under the policy, the insurance company assumed the defense. Inves-
tigation revealed no evidence of prior mental abnormality in the injured
tenant, and the company knew that the tenant had psychiatrists who would
testify that the accident caused the psychosis. It was agreed by all the
psychiatrists that a sudden fear of falling to one's death could cause this
mental illness. Nevertheless, the insurer, assuming that the jury would be-
lieve its expert testimony and reject that offered by the injured party, was
willing to pay only $3,000 for the physical injuries and refused a settlement
offer for the policy limit of $10,000. An offer to settle at $9,000 was also re-
fused in spite of insured's willingness to contribute $2,500. A jury awarded
the injured party $101,000.' Insurer paid $10,000. As a result of settle-
ment of the judgment,' the widow became indigent, suffered a decline in
physical health, and attempted suicide. Thereupon, she brought an action
against insurer for breach of an implied covenant of good faith in failing
to accept a settlement offer within the policy limits. The trial court
awarded insured $91,000 with interest and $25,000 for insured's mental
suffering. Held, affirmed: An insurer is liable for the amount in excess of
policy limits recovered from its insured and for damages for mental dis-
tress if it breaches the duty to consider the interests of insured in rejecting
settlement proposals within the policy limits. Crisci v. Security Insurance
Co., 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
Under the terms of a standard liability insurance policy the insurer must
assume exclusive control of the defense of any tort suit against the insured
within the subject matter of the policy. Insurer is given the right to nego-
tiate and decide upon settlement with the claimant. Where the claim is for
an amount greater than the policy limits, the insurer's exclusive control of
litigation and its option to settle render the insured virtually helpless in
avoiding the risk of a judgment exceeding the policy limits. Initially where
an offer by the injured party to settle had been rejected by the insurer and
a judgment over policy limits resulted, the courts were reluctant to con-
strue contractual duties broadly and extend the limited liability of the
insurer under the insurance contracts.' To determine when liability should
be imposed, two standards for measuring the conduct of insurer during its
control of negotiation and investigation were developed and are now ap-
plied, either separately or concurrently, throughout the United States."
Whether the standard of conduct is captioned "due care" or "good faith,"
liability is generally founded in tort for breach of a duty implied from the
insurance contract!
' DiMare v. Crisci, 58 Cal. 2d 292, 373 P.2d 860, 23 Cal. Rptr. 772 (1962).
'The settlement gave to the injured claimant $22,000, a forty per cent interest in insured's
claim to a particular piece of property, and a partial assignment of insured's cause of action against
the insurer.
a Note, Insurer's Refusal To Settle-A Proposal for Imposition of Liability Above Policy Limits,
60 YALE L.J. 1037 (1951).
4 For a review of cases formulating each standard, see Radcliffe v. Franklin Nat'l Ins. Co., 208
Ore. 1, 298 P.2d 1002 (1956).
a Comment, Insurance-Liability of Insurer for Judgment in Excess of Policy Limits, 48 MicH.
L. REv. 95 (1949).
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I. CALIFORNIA REASONABLE GOOD FAITH
California courts adopted the standard of good faith in 195 7.' The fol-
lowing year the California Supreme Court examined conduct falling short
of this standard,' and formulated a "rather curious definition of bad
faith"8 with an emphasis on reasonableness and language approaching that
of negligence. It declared that if there is great risk of recovery beyond
the policy limits so that the most reasonable manner of disposing of the
claim is a settlement within those limits, consideration of the insured's in-
terests requires the insurer to settle the claim. Insurer's unwarranted
refusal to accept a settlement offer constitutes a breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The basis for determining whether
an insurer should regard a settlement offer as reasonable is the obligation of
insurer to give equal consideration to the insured's interest and to its own.9
This obligation is expressed by the special issue: Would the insurer have
accepted the offer if the policy had no limits?"0
Not only is good faith defined by California courts as the most reason-
able conduct, but also the issues and evidence used to measure insurer's
conduct demonstrate the obligation of the insurer to accept a reasonable
offer. An important requirement of good faith is that intelligent consider-
ation be given to the offer of settlement based on a reasonable investiga-
tion. Therefore, a finding of bad faith can be based, among other factors,
on the strength of the injured claimant's case on the issues of liability and
damages or on failure of the insurer to properly investigate the circum-
stances so as to ascertain the evidence against the insured."2
II. TEXAS DUE CARE
Texas adopted the standard of due care in 1920 in G. A. Stowers Furni-
ture Co. v. American Indemnity Co.'" Due care was defined as "that degree
of care and diligence which a man of ordinary care and prudence would
exercise in the management of his own business."" Because the insurer
stands to lose but a part of the claim and has an interest adverse to the
interests of insured, the court reasoned that, as agent, the insurer is bound
to give the rights of the insured at least as great consideration as he does his
own." However, unlike the California doctrine of good faith, this obliga-
'Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 155 Cal. 2d 679, 319 P.2d 69 (2d Dist. 1957).
'Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198, 68 A.L.R.2d 883
(1958).
'Comment, Excess Liability: Reconsideration of California's Bad Faith Negligence Rule, 18
STAN. L. REV. 475, 476 (1966).
9See Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67 HARv. L. REV. 1136
(1954), for a discussion of the conflict of interests resulting from this obligation.
"Martin v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 228 Cal. 2d 788, 39 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1st Dist.
1964); Davy v. Public Nat'l Ins. Co., 181 Cal. 2d 387, 5 Cal. Rptr. 488 (4th Dist. 1960).
"Davy v. Public Nat'l Ins. Co., 181 Cal. 2d 387, 5 Cal. Rptr. 488 (4th Dist. 1960). In this
case the refusal of a California insurer to authorize medical examinations at the suggestion of its
attorney where the injuries were known to be serious contributed to a finding of bad faith because
the issue of damages was not given "contemplative consideration." 5 Cal. Rptr. at 496.
"Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 155 Cal. 2d 679, 319 P.2d 69 (2d Dist. 1957).
a 15 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929).
4Id. at 5 48.
"'The Stowers decision is the only Texas case to mention this conflict of interests between
insured and insurer.
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tion of the insurer under the Texas due care standard has not been a sub-
ject of appellate review as an appropriate special issue to be submitted to
the jury."6 Indeed, little elaboration has been made on the substance of the
due care standard in subsequent Texas cases.
Factors actually considered by Texas courts to establish negligence are
embraced within those used by California courts to establish bad faith. In
Stowers three factors were mentioned specifically as bearing on the question
of the insurer's negligence:" (1) the serious nature of the injuries of the
party bringing suit and all the facts and circumstances surrounding the
injury; (2) insurer's knowledge of the serious nature of the injuries;" and
(3) established company policy. 9 Negligence may be based solely on the
strength of the evidence presented by the injured claimant in the initial
suit against insured. ° Insurer's good faith is but a circumstance relevant
to the issue of negligence," and correspondingly, motive may or may not
be a factor establishing bad faith."
Because of theoretical similarities and the California stress on the obliga-
tion to accept a reasonable offer, in substance the California and Texas
doctrines of good faith and due care are the same." Likewise, the scope of
admissible evidence used in applying either rule is essentially the same.'
However, despite these similarities a comparison of the record of successful
suits by the insured in California courts with the longer but less successful
record in Texas indicates that the two standards have not had uniform
results."
III. THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES
Divergence as to the extent of damages recoverable in each jurisdiction
explains in part the lack of uniform results. Divergence exists because
'"See Jones v. Highway Ins. Underwriters, 253 S.W.2d 1018 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) error ref.
n.r.e., for illustrations of special issues submitted to the jury in a suit against insurer for negligent
refusal to settle.
"In Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 155 Cal. 2d 679, 319 P.2d 69 (2d Dist. 1957), the court
included in a list of factors indicative of bad faith, two of the factual issues mentioned in Stowers.
" The insured must prove that insurer had such knowledge or that by the exercise of ordinary
care insurer could have had such knowledge. Therefore, Stowers indicates that negligence would
be proved by insurer's failure to exercise ordinary care in its investigation.
"9 The court permitted evidence to be admitted to the effect that it was a rule of the indemnity
company never to make a settlement for more than one-half the amount of the policy.
"Highway Ins. Underwriters v. Lufkin-Beaumont Motor Coaches, Inc., 215 S.W.2d 904 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1948) error ref. n.r.e.
'lid. at 928.
"Davy v. Public Nat'l Ins. Co., 181 Cal. 2d 387, 5 Cal. Rptr. 488 (4th Dist. 1960).
' In each jurisdiction the duty is implied from the express obligations of the agreement. Com-
unale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198, 68 A.L.R.2d 883 (1958); G. A.
Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indemn. Co., 15 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929). The
relationship created thereby is said to be that of agent and principal. Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co.,
155 Cal. 2d 679, 319 P.2d 69 (2d Dist. 1957); G. A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indem.
Co., supra. The insurer is bound to give the rights and interests of the insured at least as much
consideration as he does his own interests and yet is permitted error of judgment without liability
necessarily resulting. Davy v. Public Nat'l Ins. Co., 181 Cal. 2d 387, 5 Cal. Rptr. 488 (4th Dist.
1960); Highway Ins. Underwriters v. Lufkin-Beaumont Motor Coaches, Inc., 215 S.W.2d 904
(Tex. Civ. App. 1948) error ref. n.r.e.
"Compare Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 155 Cal. 2d 679, 319 P.2d 69 (2d Dist. 1957) with
G. A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indem. Co., 15 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929).
"Out of eleven appellate cases in California since 1957, insurer lost ten; out of six cases in
Texas since 1929, insurer lost three.
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California has consistently followed a "judgment" rule of damages" while
the Texas rule is unsettled." At one time Texas courts required prepay-
ment of the judgment by insured before recovery would be allowed.
California Judgment Rule. Prior to 1967 California courts strongly em-
phasized that the damage sustained by insured was financial. In the first
case to determine whether recovery would be allowed for wrongful refusal
to settle, the court found that a solvent insured had suffered financial
damage when he was forced into bankruptcy by entry of a judgment in
excess of policy limits, although no portion of the excess amount had been
paid by insured." Thereafter, financial damage was said to exist for the
sole reason that an excess judgment was entered against insured."
The measure of insured's financial damage was determined by the char-
acter of his cause of action. Insured's action was held to sound both in
contract and in tort, but the contract basis was emphasized by the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court in Comunale v. Traders & General Insurance Co."1
In that case the court decided the measure of damages caused by both a
breach of insurer's express obligation to defend a suit against its insured
and its breach of the implied duty to settle. The court held that because
the suit related to financial damage rather than personal injury the tort
character of the action would not prevail to the exclusion of the contrac-
tual character. Insured would have freedom of election between the two
actions. The court decided to treat the suit in Coinunale as a contract
action. Therefore, to determine damages, it relied solely on the statutory
measure of damages for breach of contract, e.g., the amount which will
compensate the party aggrieved for all loss proximately caused by the
breach, or which, in the ordinary course of things, would be likely to re-
sult from it. 2 On the basis that a wrongful refusal to settle would ordi-
narily result in a judgment against insured in excess of policy limits, insurer
was held liable for the entire judgment against insured. The inference was
subsequently drawn that in California the Comunale decision established
breach of contract as the basis of insured's claim."
21 Comment, The Role of Prepayment in Excess Judgment Actions, 11 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 382
(1964).
27 As a result of the judgment rule of damages in California, insured may assign his cause of
action without payment of the excess judgment. Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d
654, 328 P.2d 198, 68 A.L.R.2d 883 (1958). In Texas if prepayment of the judgment by in-
sured is required before recovery is allowed, assignment would not be practical, because the as-
signee would also be denied recovery. No Texas court has considered the assignability of the in-
sured's action. However, the Fifth Circuit did uphold the transferability of a contingent claim
from the insured bankrupt to the trustee in bankruptcy under section 70 of the Federal Bank-
ruptcy Act, where execution of the excess judgment had forced insured into bankruptcy. Palmer
v. Travelers Ins. Co., 319 F.2d 296 (5th Cir. 1963).
" Universal Auto. Ins. Co. v. Culberson, 126 Tex. 282, 86 S.W.2d 727 (1935).
2Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 155 Cal. 2d 679, 319 P.2d 69 (2d Dist. 1957).
30Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., So Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198, 68 A.L.R.2d 883
(1958).
as Id.
12In Hunt Bros. v. San Lorenzo Co., 150 Cal. 51, 87 P. 1093 (1906), the court explained
that § 3300 of the California Civil Code had codified the general rule of Hadley v. Baxendale,
156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854). Under this statute damages for breach of contract are only those
which may reasonably be supposed to have been within the contemplation of the parties at the
time of the making of the contract, as the probable result of a breach.5 3 Critz v. Farmers Ins. Group, 230 Cal. App. 2d 788, 41 Cal. Rptr. 401 (3d Dist. 1963).
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Texas Prepayment Rule. Under Texas law insured's action is solely in
tort.' However, the extent of his recovery is not clear. To recover any
amount of the excess portion of the judgment, insured must prove finan-
cial damage. To recover exemplary damages, insured must prove gross
negligence and financial damage.' The Texas Supreme Court questioned
the existence of financial damage and denied recovery to the insured in a
case where insured had not paid the judgment and the policy was an in-
demnity agreement." The court based denial of recovery on a distinction
it drew between indemnity and liability insurance policies. Under the terms
of an indemnity policy insured could not maintain his suit for any portion
of judgment until he had paid that amount. However, the distinction be-
tween liability and indemnity policies is no longer a useful one because
the standard policy today is one of liability.
Whether prepayment would be required at the present time to prove
financial damage is a question unanswered by Texas courts. Scrutiny of the
prepayment rule reveals that it does not reflect economic realities. If in-
sured is solvent, prepayment forces him to liquidate his assets, thus in-
creasing his loss, and/or to bring successive suits for portions of the excess
judgment, as they are paid. If insured is insolvent, a stronger argument for
prepayment exists on the basis that his inability to pay makes him suffer no
actual loss. However, this reasoning makes a final judgment meaningless,
ignoring the effects of that judgment on both personal and business acqui-
sitions in an economy geared to credit. It assumes that an insolvent insured
is destined for a life of poverty and will be clever enough to acquire only
property which is statutorily exempt from the reach of his judgment
creditor. These assumptions are both "economically improbable and mor-
ally indefensible." 7 Moreover, an insolvent insured would bear the in-
equity resulting from the running of limitation on his cause of action
against insurer. For purposes of limitation in Texas, the tort is complete
and the cause of action is mature when the judgment against insured is
final."8 If an insolvent insured acquires non-exempt property after the
two-year period of limitation has run on his cause of action, levy of execu-
tion of the excess judgment by the injured claimant would bring upon in-
sured financial loss with no recourse against insured's wrongdoer. Judge
Brown of the Fifth Circuit, after examining the economic realities of the
prepayment rule, concluded that the Texas Supreme Court will recognize
that the prepayment rule would produce artificial, absurd and very dam-
aging consequences and constitute rank discrimination against the victims
of another's wrong."
" G. A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indem. Co., 15 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Comm'n App.
1929).
"SLinkenhoger v. American Fid. & Cas. Co., 152 Tex. 534, 260 S.W.2d 884 (1953).
3 Universal Auto. Ins. Co. v. Culberson, 126 Tex. 282, 86 S.W.2d 727 (1935).
" Seguros Tepeyac, S.A., Compania Mexicana v. Bostrom, 347 F.2d 167, 187 (5th Cir. 1965).
38 Linkenhoger v. American Fid. & Cas. Co., 152 Tex. 534, 260 S.W.2d 884 (1953).
39 However, the majority opinion held that the earlier Texas case refusing recovery to an in-
sured on an indemnity policy without prepayment prevented recovery of the excess over policy
limits if the insured has no assets and is completely unable to satisfy the judgment. The court
wanted partial payment to prove injury; yet it recognized, as a weakness in its rationale, that the
excess judgment is a "mortgage on insured's future," the insured being a semi-skilled worker in
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IV. THE TRIPLE IMPACT OF CRISCI
Under the facts in Crisci, the breach of the duty to consider the in-
sured's interests was clear-cut, summarized in two findings which were
"all that was required to constitute this breach."4 Evidence clearly sup-
ported the finding of considerable risk of substantial recovery beyond
policy limits. The insurer had acknowledged that the risk was great, since
both the lawyer and claims manager had agreed that an award on the men-
tal suffering issue would be at least $100,000. A second finding that the
insurer failed to consider insured's financial interests as much as its own
was clearly supported by the "unreasonable" and "blind faith" of insurer
that the jury would believe its psychiatrists exclusively. The belief was
unreasonable because the insurer knew that the claimant had credible ex-
pert testimony and the insurer's agents had stated that without prior evi-
dence of mental defects the jury was likely to believe the fall caused the
psychosis.
Impact on California Reasonable Good Faith. One aspect of the decision
will have an impact primarily on the substance of the good faith standard
of conduct in California. An attempt was made to clarify that doctrine,
bringing it even closer to the standard of due care. The court corrected
a deviation from the emphasis it had previously placed on the obligation
to dispose of the claim in the most reasonable manner by accepting the set-
tlement offer in an appropriate case."1 This emphasis had caused some
confusion over the distinction between negligence and bad faith. Several
decisions had explained the difference with statements that bad faith
"implies" or "is the equivalent of dishonesty, fraud and concealment."'
One court had added that bad faith and negligence are not legally synon-
ymous and that a determination respecting the presence or absence of good
faith involves an inquiry into motive, intent, and state of mind.4 The
Crisci decision rejected this language as being too strong and too restrictive,
explaining that the absence of evidence, circumstantial or direct, showing
actual dishonesty, fraud, or concealment is not fatal to the cause of action.
Such evidence would be relevant in determining whether the insurer has
given consideration to the insured's interest, but would not be necessary
for recovery. The court repeated that under the good faith doctrine liabil-
ity is imposed for failure to meet the duty to accept reasonable settlements,
a duty included within the implied covenant of good faith. It affirmed and
embellished the test used to translate the standard of good faith into a trial
his early twenties. Seguros Tepeyac, S.A., Compania Mexicana v. Bostrom, 347 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.
1965).
"Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 178, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
41 Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198, 68 A.L.R.2d 883
(1958).
"The former phraseology is used in Davy v. Public Nat'l Ins. Co., 181 Cal. 2d 387, 5 Cal.
Rptr. 488, 492 (4th Dist. 1960). The latter phraseology is used in Crisci v. Security Ins. Co.,
426 P.2d 173, 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967), giving the statement in Davy a much stronger
meaning.
'Davy v. Public Nat'l Ins. Co., 181 Cal. 2d 387, 5 Cal. Rptr. 488 (4th Dist. 1960).
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issue. The test is whether a "prudent insurer without policy limits would
have accepted the settlement offer.""
Impact on the Measure of Damages. The second impact of the Crisci de-
cision is the award of damages for mental suffering. The award greatly ex-
tended the measure of an insurer's liability in California. To affirm the
award, the court faced some difficulties caused by its prior reasoning. Pre-
viously the court had focused solely on financial damages suffered by in-
sured and had emphasized the contractual nature of the cause of action.
More specifically, because of the reliance on the statutory measure of
damages for breach of contract, the court first had to disapprove language
which might have been interpreted as providing that the action for wrong-
ful refusal to settle sounds solely in contract.'
The question remained whether recovery for mental suffering could be
permitted under the general rule of damages in tort codified in the Cali-
fornia Civil Code, which would include recovery for all loss proximately
caused whether the loss could have been anticipated or not." The court
pointed out that, although an award for mental suffering usually accom-
panied personal injury awards, recovery for mental distress had also been
granted in actions for invasions of property rights without personal in-
juries.4" Finding no substantial reason to distinguish the property cases
from the facts and injuries of the instant case, it concluded that a plain-
tiff who as a result of a defendant's tortious conduct loses his property and
suffers mental distress may recover not only for the pecuniary loss but
also for his mental distress.
Words of caution and limitation follow this rule of recovery." First of
all, plaintiff must have an actionable claim resulting in substantial dam-
ages to property rights or to person apart from damages due to mental
suffering. Secondly, not every case involving breach of contract would
warrant recovery for mental distress. In the instant case breach of contract
was coincident with a tort, and the contract was not obtained by the in-
sured for commercial advantage but for protection against the risks of ac-
cidental losses and against the mental distress which might follow the
losses.4"' Thirdly, the causal relationship between the refusal to settle and
the damages was not questioned by the insurer.
Impact on Strict Liability. The most extraordinary impact of the Crisci
44426 P.2d at 176.
' See text accompanying note 33 supra.
"' Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
4' The cases cited in Crisci include nuisance, tortious breach of contract to supply water, and
an action to quiet title to easement.
48 The court did not discuss the probable limitation on recovery for mental suffering in Cali-
fornia where common practice is for insured to satisfy the injured party by an assignment in ex-
change for an agreement not to levy execution. Although the insured in Crisci made an assign-
ment, the injured party had previously recovered a portion of the excess $91,000. An assignment
before execution in exchange for a covenant not to levy execution would preclude recovery for
mental suffering under most conditions. In addition, the court's stress on substantial damages and
loss of property could prevent an insolvent insured from recovering damages for mental distress.
4a As an example of a contract directly concerning the comfort, happiness or personal esteem
of one of the parties, the court cites a graphic example, Chelini v. Nieri, 32 Cal. 2d 480, 196
P.2d 915 (1948) (breach of a contract to preserve the body of the plaintiff's mother).
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decision is that it considered, as dictum, the merits of making the insurer
strictly liable for the amount of a verdict in excess of the policy limits if
an offer to settle within those limits is refused. The basis for imposing strict
liability was the contractual origin of the duty to consider the insured's
interests. The court pointed out that ordinarily contractual duties are
strictly enforced and not subject to a standard of reasonableness. It indi-
cated that certain propositions are beyond dispute: (1) that the interests
of insured and insurer are in conflict whenever there is even slight danger
of judgment in excess of the policy limits, (2) that settlement is one of
the usual methods by which insured receives protection under the policy,
and (3) that purchase of a policy permits the reasonable belief by insured
that a sum equal to policy limits is available and will be used.
Four arguments supporting imposition of strict liability were discussed.
(1) Strict liability "is a simple rule to apply and avoids the burdens of a
determination whether a settlement offer within the policy limits was rea-
sonable.""° The burden of determination in this case fell upon a trial court
sitting without a jury. Criticism of submitting questions of bad faith or
negligence to a jury would enforce this argument,5' as would similar
criticism of the standard of due care." (2) Strict liability would eliminate
the danger that an insurer might reject a settlement offer near the policy
limits and gamble with the insured's money to further its own interest. As
one commentator pointed out in an article cited by the court, a "no set-
tlement program" to discourage nuisance claims and a "selective litigation
program" to establish favorable precedents are difficult factors to measure
or prove and while protecting insurance as an institution, these policies
ignore the interests of the insured." (3) The size of the judgment furnishes
an inference that the value of the claim is an equivalent amount and that
settlement was the most reasonable method of dealing with the claim. For
this reason the burden placed on insurers by a rule of strict liability might
not be substantially greater than the burden under existing law." (4) A
reason stated consistently by commentators proposing strict liability is the
court's argument that "there is more than a small amount of elementary
justice in a rule that would require that, in this situation where the in-
surer's and insured's interests necessarily conflict, the insurer, which may
reap the benefits of this determination not to settle, should also suffer the
detriments of its decision."
V. CONCLUSION
The Crisci decision has important implications beyond its own jurisdic-
50426 P.2d at 177.
51 Appelman, Duty of Liability Insurer to Compromise Litigation, 26 Ky. L.J. 100, 111 (1938);
Comment, supra note 8, at 481; Comment, suPra note 5, at 101.
52 Comment, Insurer's Liability for Judgments Exceeding Policy Limits, 38 TEXAS L. REv. 233,
236 n.18, 238 (1959); Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67 HARV.
L. REV. 1136 (1954).
53Comment, suPra note 8, at 483.
" One commentator has stated that strict liability, or requiring the insurer to pay the full
amount of any judgment rendered against the insured, would certainly require him to act as a
reasonable man in the position of the insured would act in the conduct of his own affairs. Com-
ment, supra note 5, at 102.
5426 P,2d at 177.
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tion. Although the court might have disappointed those who wished for a
clarification of the features of bad faith distinguishing it from negligence,
its discussion of the correct statement of the standard of good faith will
afford a pattern of reasoning for a jurisdiction following the standard of
due care. Certainly a Texas court would have held Mrs. Crisci's insurer
liable for the amount of the judgment above policy limits on the basis of
the two findings of fact deemed sufficient by the California courtY
The award of damages for mental suffering has the most important and
far-reaching impact. The award is the first in any jurisdiction to give such
recovery to an insured in a suit for wrongful refusal of a settlement offer."
What is also important and surprising is that in California the courts
would need to give additional protection to the insured. In that state the
insurer is in a "poor tactical position" at trial and has "minimal chances""
on appeal. An insurer should have been sufficiently informed and warned
by decisions prior to Crisci of the duty to give consideration to an insured's
interests in settlement offers and of the consequences of its failure to do
so. The conclusion follows that the award of damages for mental suffering
had a punitive purpose, 9 coupled with the threat of a future adoption of
strict liability by California courts.
Because Texas courts have shown an early reluctance to face the economic
realities of an excess judgment, making recovery of the excess by insured
at present uncertain, there might be reluctance to award recovery for men-
tal suffering in a case of ordinary negligence. The general Texas rule in an
action to recover for an injury done to property does not recognize mental
suffering as an element of actual damages. " Exceptions of long standing to
this rule have been made in cases of libel and slander, physical injuries,
suits against carriers for wrongful ejection and other suits connected with
peculiar personal inconvenience. " However, unlike the California analogy
to cases involving injury to property, these exceptions permitting recovery
for mental suffering as actual damages have emphasized that the injury is
the result of a wilful act." If wilfulness is required, recovery for mental
suffering as actual damages would be tantamount to a showing of gross
negligence. Moreover, if recovery for mental suffering was considered pu-
nitive in purpose, it would be even more likely that Texas courts would
require a showing of gross negligence.
Certainly a rule of strict liability would give an additional or an alterna-
tive measure of protection to the insured. In Texas insured is afforded little
protection because of the possibility that prepayment might be required.
Until the question of whether Texas courts will require prepayment of the
judgment by insured is answered, it is doubtful that a rule of strict liabil-
56 Even assuming Texas would require prepayment, an insured in Mrs. Crisci's position would
recover because $22,000 was paid to insurer.
1
7 Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 168 (1955).
58 Comment, supra note 8, at 480.
" The trial court refused to award punitive damages to Mrs. Crisci. Her recovery of $25,000
for mental suffering was an award of general damages.
"°Hunt v. Weems, 208 S.W.2d 423 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) error dismissed.
"
1 Williams v. Yoe, 46 S.W. 659 (Tex. Civ. App. 1898).
"
2 Michels v. Crouch, 122 S.W.2d 211 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
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ity would be considered in this jurisdiction as a threat to make the insurer
consider the interests of its insured.
Beverly A. Neblett
